Pakistan Social Sciences Review
www.pssr.org.pk

RESEARCH PAPER

Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: A Potential Threat to Israel

1Umar Farooq *, 2 Muhammad Saqib and 3 Dr. Ghulam Mustafa

1. Under-graduate student of Department of International Relations Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan
2. PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan
3. Associate Professor, Department of International Relations Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan

| *Corresponding Author: | umarfarooqjuttj@gmail.com |

ABSTRACT

This article examines non-conventional threats to Israel's security. The objective of this paper is to analyze how Iranian nuclear ambitions are threat to Israel's sovereignty. In the 1950s, US provided nuclear reactor to Iran under the "Atoms for peace program" initiative. The nuclear ambition of Iran rises security concerns for Israel as the Iran has not good relations with Israel in the past. The Islamic Republic has ideological perspective related to Israel regardless of its political affiliation, Iranian leadership views Israel as a cornerstone of American hegemony. Although, Iran is not known as to possesses nuclear weapons but it the capability and ability to build nuclear weapons. For Israelis it would decrease their regional influence and limit Israel not to direct attack on Iranian proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis in the region. This research is based on qualitative data extracted from books, journal articles, websites and state officials' opinions. Consequently, hostility between two middle eastern countries have considerably increased as the result of Iranian nuclear ambitions and perhaps the development of nuclear program. Particularly, Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program and possibly the development of nuclear weapons has raised tensions between the two nations. Deterrence combined with the preparedness and conventional military methods of the Israel Defense Forces. A direct bilateral resolution is improbable given the current tensions and mistrust between Israel and Iran. A multilateral strategy combining global stakeholders (such as the U.S., EU, Russia, and China) and regional powers (such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) may instead offer an impartial forum to start a dialogue. The objective would be the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (MENWFZ), a concept that has been put out in international forum but has never been implemented.

| **KEYWORDS** | Nuclear Ambitions, Threat Perception, Iran-Israel Relations, Nuclear Deterrence, Regional Order |

Introduction

Iran started his nuclear program in the 1950s. United States helped Iran to develop nuclear reactor through his "Atoms for Peace Program". President Eisenhower initiated this program to assist developing countries to use nuclear power for energy and for other peaceful purposes (Muzaffar, et. al., 2017).This program also beneficial for United States to secure its allies during the Cold War Era. US supplied reactor named as Tehran Research Reactor began in 1960 (Muzaffar & Khan, 2016). According to U.S documents Iran adopted ambitious approach to engineer 10-20 nuclear power reactors to produce commercial power by 1994. Iran guarantees not to develop nuclear weapons as it signed NPT in 1968 and ratify the treaty in 1970 which indicates that Iran is not willing to use nuclear technology for military purposes. Iran also submitted also a

resolution to U.N General Assembly to make middle East nuclear free-zone. Despite its guarantees Iran breaches the roles of NPT and continue its efforts to construct nuclear weapons. International Atomic Agency reports revealed that Iran conducted experiments in the 1980s and 1990s for conversion of Uranium. In 1985 U.S intelligence report cited Iran as "proliferation threat" stated that Tehran is interested to develop fissile material that is used in nuclear weapons. Report discussed that it would take a decade to do so. After a gap of 10 years intelligence agencies revealed that Tehran aggressively working on its nuclear program.

Later on, Joint Comprehensive talks between U.S, China, Russia, France, Britain and Germany commonly called as P5+1 started in 2015. JCPOA concluded that Iran would refrain from building water-moderated reactors for 15 years and also refrain from any nuclear activity indefinitely. Iranian officials have repeatedly asserted that their nuclear ambitions are only for peaceful purposes. Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini said in June 3, 2008 speech Iran opposed to nuclear weapons based on religious and Islamic views and also high cost required to keep them. He added that nuclear weapons are not beneficial for states because they are not used (Kerr, 2016).

Iran signed nuclear Non-proliferation treaty in 1968 and ratify it in 1970. NPT banned countries other than U.S, China, Russia, France and Britain to hold nuclear weapons (Khan, et. al., 2019).As Iran is legally binding not to breach the roles of non-proliferation treaty means that Iran cannot test any nuclear weapon but non-nuclear states only use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Iran threatened European powers to withdraw from NPT if they refer Iran to United Nation Security Council. State Foreign Minister quoted that if European powers send Iran's file to UNSC, we will withdraw from NPT. As Iran already threatened world major powers to withdraw from NPT. Islamic Republic choices are numerous and state policy makers analyzing them and withdrawal from NPT is one of them. Zarif told media in April 2019, as U.S already imposed economic sanctions on Iran, so there is limited time left to save the deal of JCPOA. In May 2018 Donald Trump withdrew the U.S from the deal and imposed more sanctions on Iran for the sake to pressurize the Iran in order to halt Iran from its nuclear program. In response to U.S sanctions Tehran breaches the deal and taking every necessary step to succeed in the field of nuclear race (Beres, 2017).

The relationship between Iran and Israel has been complex and changing over time from cooperation to hostility. Since the independence of Israel in 1949 both countries have friendly relations promoted by common geo-political interests including the fear of soviet communism and Nasserite Pan-Arabism. Iranian revolution of 1979 dramatically changed the relation from cooperation to antagonism but some level of cooperation sustained between both countries because Iran seeing Israel as a counterweight to Baathist Iraq. In response, Israeli leaders perceived that Iran would balance not only Iraq but also diminish the influence of other regional countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Suez crisis of 1956 compelled Israel to align with non-Arab countries like Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia owing to increasing hegemony of Nasser. Another justification of cooperation is that both states have perceived potential threat from Iraq. Moreover, never officially recognized Iran started its informal relations with Israel in back 1950s and both states continue their mutual ties and shared interests until the Iranian revolution. This sheds the light on the changing of dynamics in the regional order and geo-political tensions. The reason behind shift of cooperation to hostility is the internal change in the Iranian government from monarchy to democracy (Bera, 2024).

The battle in Gaza has embarked debates on the Iran-Israel conflict, in which Iran uses its proxy networks to oppose Israel on several fronts while avoiding direct involvement. Iran is a serious threat to Israel because of its expanding power, nuclear weapons, and support for organizations like Hezbollah. Israeli strategists suggest a number of strategies, such as establishing regional alliances, preserving military dominance, and holding talks with Iran. But the article's main focus is on Israel's changing place in Iran's strategic thinking. Although Iran still harbors ideological animosity toward Israel, Israeli retaliation and regional shifts have increased Iran's view of Israel as a security danger. This implies that Israel's strategic importance in Iran may not be set in stone and may change in response to changes in geopolitics. The conflict in Gaza presents Israel with a chance to reconsider

Literature Review

"Isreal's Threat Perception: Analysis of Israel and Iran's Relations and Iran's Nuclear Ambitions" is written by Srishti Bera. This study examines Israel, which was founded in the midst of controversy and is bordered by Arab nations, has had to make significant security expenditures because it has faced existential threats from its founding. It has been at odds with neighboring Arab countries for a long time and is situated in a religiously significant region, including Jerusalem. Israel understands that losing even one conflict might have disastrous consequences, even though it is greatly outnumbered in terms of both people and resources. Its borders with Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon are still controversial. In order to combat threats such as Iran's regional aspirations, nuclear proliferation, and asymmetric warfare, Israel's security doctrine is centered on deterrence, strength, and partnerships. Israel's national security strategy, which prioritizes survival, strategic advantage, and resilience in a dangerous region, has been changed by the constantly changing nature of these problems (Bera, 2024).

"Iran's Nuclear Program: A Contentious Discourse" is written by Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. In this article Jaspal tried to explain how Iran's nuclear program poses a significant threat to Israel, particularly amid escalating regional tensions, including the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iran-Israel strikes. Growing regional tensions, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iran-Israel strikes, have made Iran's nuclear program a serious danger to both Saudi Arabia and Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would challenge Israel's regional supremacy and give its proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis) more confidence, which might lead to a nuclear arms race. Amid growing concerns, Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, have indicated that they are prepared to use nuclear weapons if threatened. In order to preserve parity, Riyadh is pursuing its own nuclear program because Saudi Arabia fears that Iran's nuclearization will destabilize the region. These dangers are made worse by Iran's sophisticated missile capabilities, such as the Fattah-2 hypersonic missile. Iran has not formally tested nuclear weapons, but its advancements in delivery systems and fissile material highlight the growing threat, forcing Saudi Arabia and Israel to strengthen their deterrence measures in the face of a volatile Middle East (Jaspal, 2024).

"Analytical Appraisal of the 2024 Iran-Israel Conflict and Chances of Global Escalation" is written by Amad, Farhat and Shanzay in 2024. This research shed light on the theoretical perspective of Iran and Israel relations. The conflict between Iran and Israel can be understood through realist international relations theory, which focuses on state power, national interests, and the anarchic nature of the global system. Central to their rivalry is the security dilemma, where actions by one state to boost its security are seen as threats by the other. Israel's nuclear ambiguity and Iran's nuclear program fuel

mutual distrust, escalating tensions. Realism also highlights the balance of power, with both nations vying for regional dominance, as noted by scholars like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. External actors, such as the U.S. supporting Israel and Russia and China increasing their regional influence, further complicate the dynamic. Ultimately, realism explains the conflict through the lens of power struggles, security concerns, and hegemonic ambitions (Minhas, Shujahi, & Saeed, 2024).

"Iran's "Forward Defense," Israel's Security Dilemma, and American Strategy" is written by Jay Mens in 2024. This research work highlights Iranian existential threat to Israel's security. Despite domestic demonstrations and international attention, Iran's nuclear program continued to pose a serious threat to Israel in 2022–2023. Under Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel placed a high priority on repairing relations with Saudi Arabia and postponing Iran's nuclear aspirations. But Israel's focus was undermined by internal turmoil and military dissension. Iran took advantage of this by aiding Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank, which caused the conflict's focus to move away from Gaza. Hezbollah and the IRGC helped Iranian-backed militias step up their attacks, putting Israel's security at risk. Israel's deterrence was made more difficult by the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, which further destabilized the West Bank. There have been calls for strong diplomatic, economic, and military steps to contain Iran's nuclear goals and regional influence because of the country's nuclear advancements and its regional proxy networks, which continue to constitute an existential threat to Israel (Mens, 2024).

Material and Methods

This research is based on qualitative data extract from articles, books, newspapers, websites, analysis of think tanks and official publications such as policy documents and opinions of state officials. The research also includes the data from talk shows, state official statements, diplomatic negotiations between ambassadors. It also includes researcher personal opinions which he builds during research work after analyzing combination of books, articles and research papers.

Results and Discussion

Iran and Israel: An Ideological Shift

The change in the policy of Iran and adopting a dual policy towards Israel over the years is due to the change regional dynamics and regional hegemony in Middle East. Iran has made pragmatic choices based on what is best for the nation in an effort to strike a balance between its revolutionary objectives and its national interests. Although Iran cherishes its ideological convictions, it frequently opts for short-term solutions because it thinks they won't compromise its long-term values. For instance, Iran supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Christian nation of Armenia and the Shiite Muslim nation of Azerbaijan. Iran did this because it was concerned that if Azerbaijan gained too much influence, it may incite secession among Iran's sizable Azeri population. Iran also backed Russia's rule over Chechnya in the 1990s, even though Russia brutally suppressed Chechen separatists. Although it may have sympathized with the Chechens as Muslims vying for independence, Iran chose this decision because its alliance with Russia was crucial for strategic and economic reasons.

Iran decided to give the Shiite rebels in Iraq very little help in 1991, despite the fact that the uprising was violently put down and that it seriously damaged vital Shiite

religious sites. Iran made this decision because it did not want to become embroiled in another war with Iraq. Iran was wary and didn't want to inflame the situation or run the danger of starting another conflict with its neighbor (Eiran, 2020). In areas where Iran's national interests weren't directly at risk, it showed stronger support for movements that shared its ideological beliefs. This dedication to its revolutionary beliefs was obvious in its dealings with countries and groups like Sudan, and radical organizations such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. However, Iran's approach was not always consistent. Depending on the circumstances, local politics, and particular strategic goals at the moment, its degree of support might change. So, while Iran kept loyal to its ideology, its support for these groups was sometimes inconsistent or changed based on broader geopolitical reasons (Menashri, 1999). The government of Iran has been successful in striking a balance between the nation's interests and its revolutionary aspirations. This adaptability has been a major asset, enabling them to modify their policies in response to evolving circumstances. Iran's leaders have maintained the flexibility to make strategic choices, negotiate challenging circumstances, and develop solutions that tackle the intricate problems they confront by focusing on either their revolutionary vision or state interests as necessary. Iran has been able to better handle both its internal and external problems thanks to this flexibility.

Iran's policy has changed throughout time, frequently putting its own national interests ahead of rigid orthodoxy. Its animosity toward Israel, however, has stayed consistent and steadfast. All of Iran's main political parties share this strong antagonism, which is an essential component of the country's political and ideological position (Zimmt, 2024).

Shift of Regional Dynamics

Iran has traditionally viewed itself as being in a challenging and insecure region, encircled by terrorist groups, weak or failed states, and outside meddling. Iran's primary objective is to defend itself against these dangers and guarantee its borders, sovereignty, unification, and general security (Tabatabai, 2020). Iran's perspective on security has been significantly shaped by its past. Iranians pride themselves on their influence after decades of independence and dominance in the region. However, Iran also feels vulnerable and suspicious of outsiders as a result of foreign meddling, territorial occupation, and sovereignty violations.

The Iran-Iraq War is among the most traumatic events that shaped this way of thinking. Iraq utilized chemical weapons, attacked Iran, and had the backing of numerous nations, including the majority of Arab nations, during this conflict. As a result of numerous countries preventing it from obtaining weapons, Iran was left alone and found it difficult to defend itself. This war left a deep scar on Iran's national memory and drives its leaders to take every possible step to avoid a similar situation in the future (Kam E. , 2021).

A considerable threat to Iran was eliminated with the fall of the Soviet Union, and Iraq's military has been greatly undermined since the 2003 U.S. invasion and the Gulf Wars. But now, the biggest perceived threat to Iran is the United States. The United States is perceived as being prepared to use force and attempting to topple the Iranian regime because of its substantial military forces close to Iran, its strong regional allies, and its military dominance over neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq. Tensions are heightened by the U.S.'s strong economic pressure on Iran. Iran confronts extra difficulties because it is

less developed in conventional weaponry than its primary competitors, especially in air power, and lacks powerful state-level allies to fight its adversaries (Ephraim, 2007).

Iran's increasing security worries over the past 20 years are strongly linked to its attempts to increase its regional influence. According to academics, these fears are a result of significant occurrences that have changed the region. Iran's sense of vulnerability was heightened by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which pushed American military forces close to its borders. Fears of losing strategic footing were raised by the 2011 Syrian civil war, which endangered the stability of a vital regional ally. Furthermore, Iran's borders and regional interests were directly threatened by the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014. among an effort to protect its security and fend off possible threats, these events taken together have pushed Iran to expand its influence among its neighbors (Akbar, 2021).Scholars Ahmadian and Mohseni contend that studying Iran's threat perceptions can help us better understand its policies. They contend that the tight relations between Iran and Syria stem from a similar sense of vulnerability and the need to defend against shared challenges, especially those posed by the United States, Israel, and the Baathist regime in Iraq. Their alliance was fortified by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the continued American military presence close to both nations, creating what is referred to as the "axis of resistance." The goal of this partnership is to shield Syria and Iran from one another's threats. As both countries looked to secure their existence against mounting external challenges following the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the significance of this cooperation only increased (Hassan & Payam, 2019).

Development on Nuclear Program

Iran's nuclear program should not be seen solely as a response to its rivalry with Israel. The program actually began during the Shah's rule, long before the Islamic Revolution. However, after the revolution, Khomeini halted the program, calling nuclear technology "the work of the devil." This decision, along with the withdrawal of European and American support, led to the cancellation of contracts for nuclear power stations and the departure of foreign experts who had been building them. It was the Iran-Iraq War that motivated the Islamic regime to revive the nuclear program. In 1982, Iran reorganized its Atomic Energy Organization and resumed efforts to develop the technical and scientific infrastructure needed to eventually achieve self-sufficiency in nuclear technology (Kam, 2004).

In reaction to Iraq's deployment of chemical and biological weapons as well as its developing missile capabilities, which directly threatened Tehran and other Iranian cities, Iran chose to resurrect its nuclear program during the Iran-Iraq War. The necessity to counter Iraq's capacity for mass devastation, particularly in light of Iran's heavy wartime casualties, motivated this choice. Iran turned its attention to repelling other threats after Iraq's fall after the Gulf War in 1991. The leadership believed that having nuclear weapons would stop the US from attacking Iran with its strategic military might. Iran also wanted to deter Israel from bombing its nuclear installations. It's interesting to note that Iran's decision to pursue nuclear development did not appear to be significantly influenced by its perception that Israel already possessed nuclear weapons. The program's main goal was to fortify Iran's defenses against many possible dangers (Ephraim, 2007).

Some Iranian leaders made hints in the late 1980s that, in specific situations, Iran would think about creating nuclear weapons. In October 1988, Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani, then-president of Iran and the country's parliament chairman, made a significant declaration. He recognized the crucial role that WMDs—such as chemical, biological, and radioactive weapons—had played in the Iran-Iraq War while addressing Iranian soldiers. He underlined that Iran must be ready to deploy these weapons both offensively and defensively. Iran's increasing recognition of the strategic significance of these weapons and their potential for advancement as part of its national security strategy was reflected in this statement (Kam, 2004). In his memoirs published in September 2006, Rafsanjani disclosed a letter from July 1987 in which Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, gave his justifications for reaching a ceasefire with Iraq, bringing an end to the protracted and catastrophic Iran-Iraq War. Khomeini cited a letter from Mohsen Rezaee, the Revolutionary Guards commander at the moment, that he received on June 23, 1987. Rezaee admitted in this letter that Iran would not be able to win the battle in the next five years unless it obtained substantial resources, including sophisticated weapons like nuclear and laser weapons. This acknowledgement demonstrated the stark obstacles Iran faced in pursuing the conflict and the pressure on Khomeini to recognize a ceasefire as a realistic requirement (Fathi, 2006).

Although Israel's clandestine operations, such as sabotage and assassinate ones, against Iran's nuclear program may have impeded its advancement, they also seem to have increased tensions. Tehran made the decision to raise its uranium enrichment levels to 20% in reaction to the murder of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Following an explosion at the Natanz enrichment facility in April 2021, this was followed by an additional escalation to 60% enrichment. According to these acts, Israel's efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear development also incited Iran to speed up its enrichment operations, putting it closer to weapons-grade capabilities (Ynet, 2021).

Conclusion

Historically, Israel's security strategy has focused on winning wars, preventing wars through detection, and deterrence. But when conventional combat gives way to hybrid warfare, which is marked by unconventional weapons, nuclear threats, and terrorist organizations, Israel needs to improve its technological superiority and defense capabilities. Israel prioritizes preserving a competitive advantage through human expertise, cutting-edge weapons, and superior intelligence, especially cyber intelligence, in order to secure its existence and lessen threats. Early risk detection and covert action, frequently as part of the "Campaign between the Wars," which tries to counter threats without open military confrontations, are crucial functions of the intelligence community. Former Chief of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin stressed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) can provide significant deterrence to stop strikes, even though an aggressor's capabilities and intentions might not be completely neutralized. By actively preserving peace, strengthening deterrence, and showcasing its might to discourage potential attackers, the IDF maintains a state of readiness at all times.

Israel's security environment is complicated and dynamic, with the threat of conventional battles continuing to exist alongside the difficulties posed by hybrid and cognitive warfare. The state must modify its doctrine, create a strong force structure, and incorporate state-of-the-art military technologies because it faces numerous enemies on all sides. Furthermore, to enhance system-wide capabilities and keep a competitive edge, a robust organizational structure, highly qualified personnel, and cutting-edge training initiatives are necessary. According to some academics, Israel should contemplate specific types of "nuclear disclosure," while rigorously adhering to its policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons, in order to successfully deter rivals. Because

contemporary dangers are complex and multidimensional, preventing or countering any destruction—from minor skirmishes to major wars—requires a coordinated, multi-operational approach. Israel must always be ready to fend against unusual attacks, especially in light of the combined threats from Iranian and Palestinian aggression. This necessitates continuous intelligence management, military preparedness, updated weapons, and the capacity to act swiftly in the event of an unconventional confrontation. To maintain the security and resilience of the state in this complicated context, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) must prioritize operational preparedness and strategic alertness.

Reducing tensions between Iran and Israel requires diplomatic discussions and agreements. To resolve their disputes, both governments should give top priority to non-military means such direct government-to-government discussions, diplomatic initiatives, and intelligence-sharing. However, there is little chance that hostilities would be reduced anytime soon as both countries aim to gain regional supremacy. External players like the United States and Saudi Arabia, particularly in light of their recent rapprochement with Iran, can be extremely helpful in promoting de-escalation efforts in light of the current difficulties. In order to stop additional animosity and discourage any future military conflicts, these countries must cooperate in mediating between Israel and Iran.

Recommendations

1. To put up a united front against Iranian nuclear threats, Israel should deepen its strategic alliances with Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through defense cooperation and intelligence sharing.
2. Support Mossad's clandestine efforts to keep an eye on and impede Iran's nuclear development, with a particular emphasis on monitoring of important facilities and personnel engaged in enrichment and weaponization.
3. Under the IAEA framework, Israel should spearhead diplomatic efforts to persuade the UN and other international organizations to impose more stringent inspections and sanctions on Iran's nuclear program.
4. Israel must upgrade its missile defense systems and make sure it is prepared for any required preemptive or retaliatory strikes in order to maintain credible military options while putting diplomacy first.
5. By highlighting the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran and portraying it as a worldwide threat, you can use the media and diplomatic channels to rally support from countries other than your conventional allies.

References

Akbar, A. (2021, August). Iran's Regional Influence in Light of Its Security Concerns. *Middle East Policy, 8*(4), 24-42.

Bera, S. (2024, April). Israel's Threat Perception: Analysis of Israel and Iran's Relations and Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. *Internatinal Journal of Novel Research and development, 9*(4), 2456-4184.

Beres, L. R. (2017). The Potentially Existential Threat to Israel from Iran. *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.*

Eiran, E. (2020, April 7). Structural Shifts and Regional Security:A View from Israel. *IAI PAPERS, 20*(1), 25.

Ephraim. (2007, Feb). *A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done?* (J. Rosen, Ed.) Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies. Retrieved April 04, 2025, from TEL AVIV University:

Fathi, N. (2006, Oct 6). Khomeini's old letter revives Iran nuclear debate. *The sydney morning Herald*

Hassan, A., & Payam, M. (2019, March). Iran's Syria strategy: the evolution of deterrence. *International Affairs, 95*(2), 341-364.

Jaspal, Z. N. (2024, December 31). Iran's Nuclear Program: A Contentious Discourse. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 12*(2), 09-32

Kam. (2004). From terror to nuclear bombs: The significance of the Iranian threat. *Ministry of Defense Publishing House.*, 11.

Kam, E. (2021). *Iran's Deterrence Concept.* TEL AVIV university.

Khan, R., Muzaffar, M. & Khan, I. (2019). Iranian Nuclear Program: Impacts on Saudi-Iran Relations, *Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 3*(I), 54-64

Kerr, P. K. (2016). *Iran's Nuclear Program: Status.* Congressional Research Service.

Menashri, D. (1999). *Iran after Khomeini: Revolutionary ideology versus national interests.* Tel Aviv University paper.

Mens, J. (2024). *Iran's "Forward Defense," Israel's Security Dilemma and American Strategy.* Elsevier Ltd.

Minhas, A. S., Shujahi, F. K., & Saeed, S. (2024, July). Analytical Appraisal of the 2024 Iran-Israel Conflict and Chances of Global. *Journal of Law and Social Sciences, 2*(2), 2959-29997.

Muzaffar, M. & Khan, I (2016). China-Russia Relations after the Cold War, *Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences*, 1 (II), 151-169

Muzaffar, M., Khan, R., & Yaseen, Z. (2017). Saudi – Iran Strife: Complexities for Pakistan**,** *Global Regional Review, 2* (II), 119-134

Tabatabai. (2020). *No conquest, no defeat: Iran's national security strategy*. Oxford University Press

Ynet. (2021, April). Iran president calls 60% enrichment an answer to Israel's 'evilness'. *The Hindu*

Zimmt, R. (2024, March). From Ideological Animosity to Strategic Rivalry: The Evolution of Iran's Perception of Israel. *A multidiscipliinary Journal on National Security, 27*(1), 45-85.